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BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
GLEN J. ELLIS, 
Plaintiff & Appellant 
vs . 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Defendant & Respondent, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
SUPREME COURT 
CASE NO. 880-0333 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Plaintiff-Appellant appeals from a denial of Benefits 
by the Utah State Retirement Board, which was sustained by the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, and from an adverse 
ruling by the Utah Court of Appeals.: 
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
Jurisdiction for this writ is based on Rule 42 of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court based on an erroneous decision 
of the Court of Appeals, and Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-4 U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF'S DISABILITY QUALIFIED HIM FOR 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER SECTION 49-10-28 UCA, and THE EFFECT 
OF THE 1983 ENACTMENT OF 49-9a-8 UCA HAD ON HIS VESTED BENEFITS. 
2. WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF HAS A CONSTITUTIONALLY VESTED 
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO AN EARNED DISABILITY PENSION? 
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CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION AND STATUTE 
1. Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution, "No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law." 
Statutes to be construedf 
2. 49-9a-8 U.C.A. See full text in the appendix. 
3. 49-10-28 U.C.A. See full text in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sued for disability retirement benefits under 
the 1967 Public Employees Disability Retirement provisions but 
was refused benefits by the Retirement Board based on their 
attorney's opinion, that passage of the 1983 Disability 
Retirement' Act and particularly 49-9a-8 U.C.A. had "implicitly 
repealed" the previous Disability Retirement Statute. 
49-10-28 U.C.A. was later repealed by the legislature, 
effective July 1, 1987, one year after Plaintiff's July 1, 1986 
retirement date. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
After administrative denial of benefits, Plaintiff was 
granted a hearing before the Retirement Board which affirmed the 
administrative decision. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County affirmed. Plaintiff appealed to the Utah State Court of 
Appeals which held that the 1983 Act did not repeal the earlier 
statute and also held that retirement benefits under the 1963 
Act vested in the constitutional sense but affirmed disallowance 
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of benefits because Plaintiff did not meet the qualification of 
total disability in the 1983 Act. Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Rehearing which the Appeals Court denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff was the head of the Provo City 
Attorney's Office for twenty-one and one-half (21 1/2) years, 
(from January, 1965 to July, 1986), during twenty of those years 
the Plaintiff, and his employer, on his behalf contributed under 
the Utah State Retirement Act a percentage of his annual salary 
which included a contribution of .04% of his salary to the 
Disability Retirement Fund, pursuant to 49-10-28 U.C.A. 
2. On April 28, 1986 the Plaintiff applied to the 
City for disability retirement based on his physicians1 
recommendation that he seek less stressful employment (See 
Exhibit "A" attached). 
3. The city accepted the medical retirement request 
effective July 1, 1986 , and the City certified Plaintiff's 
qualifications for retirement under 49-10-28 U.C.A. to the State 
Retirement Office (See Exhibit* "B" attached). 
4. On June 13, 1986, Bert Hunsaker, Executive 
Director of the Retirement Board, denied benefits on the sole 
ground that the disability provisions of 49-10 had been 
superceded by the enactment in 1983 of Sections 49-9a-4 and 
49-9a-8 (See Exhibit "C" attached). 
5. Plaintiff requested and was granted a hearing 
before the Retirement Board, which Board acknowledged that he 
was qualified to retire under 49-10-28 U.C.A., but denied 
benefits under the same theory, that there had been an "implicit 
repeal" of that section, based on their legal counsel's 
interpretation of 49-9a-8 U.C.A. Plaintiff's appeal of the 
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administrative denial of his request for benefits was affirmed 
by the Retirement Board, (See Exhibit " D " ) . 
6. The matter was then appealed to the Third District 
Court in Salt Lake County where Judge Noel was of the opinion 
that the legislature did not intend that the two disability 
retirement programs described in 49-9a and 49-10-28 U.C.A. exist 
side by side and Judge Noel without a hearing or trial granted 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (See Exhibit " E " ) . 
7. The Plaintiff next appealed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, which on July 6, 1988 entered an opinion which held 
directly contrary to the "implicit repeal" theory, but affirmed 
the District Court's judgment (See Exhibit "F" attached). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF'S DISABILITY RETIREMENT 
QUALIFIED HIM FOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER 
SECTION 49-10-28 OF THE UTAH CODE AND THE 
EFFECT THAT THE 1983 AMENDMENT HAD ON VESTED 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS? 
1. The sole basis for admistrative denial of 
Plaintiff's request for retirement benefits under 49-10-28 
U.C.A. was a claimed "implicit repeal" of the 1967 Public 
Employee's Retirement Act disability benefits, which Defendant 
claimed was affected by the passage of the new disability 
retirement provisions found in 49-9a U.C.A. The Court of 
Appeals did not agree with the trial court's premise and held 
"thus, in 1983 the legislature, by clear , express language 
provided that two disability retirement systems would co-exist 
in Utah. " (See Appeals Court Opinion, center paragraph of page 
three.) 
2. The Appeals Court continued on however, and 
erroneously interpreted 49-9a-8 U.C.A. as applying to all 
disabilities with the date of disability after July 1, 1983. The 
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court skipped over the key word, "covered" , which differentiates 
between the two self-subsisting retirement disability systems, 
The key word, "covered", is the second word of 49-9a-8 which 
reads: 
"All covered disabilities with an effective date 
of disability on or after the effective date of 
this act shall be administered under this act. 
Disabilities commencing before the effective date 
of this act shall be administered under the 
provisions of Chapter 10, Title 49« In no event, 
may a disability be covered under both Chapter 10, 
Title 49 and this act." (Emphasis added.) 
The court then proceeds to rely entirely on the 
time relationship of the disability and the effective date 
of the 1983 disability act and ignores four important 
points. 
(1) The first point is that they missed the key 
word in 49-9a-8 which makes it applicable only to "covered" 
disabilities. An employee whose employer opted not to 
subscribe for the optional coverage provided by 49-9a, (a 
decision which is made by the unit of government, with no 
input from the employee) is not "covered", and his 
disability is not a "covered disability" under the 
statute. Since his disability is not "covered" by 49-9a, 
the only real question is whether he is covered by 49-10-28 
U.C.A. 
(2) Second, there is a vast difference between 
the definition of a covered disability in the new 
disability act which requires "total disab il_i_t_y_ to perform 
any r enumer a ,tiye_ , employment" as compared with the much 
broader definition of disability under 49-10-6(34) where 
disability means "incapacity of a member to perform the 
usual duties of _ _h_is_ employment with an employer." 
Plaintiff's condition is not, by definition, "covered" by 
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49-9a, but is by 49-10-28. 
(3) The third point which the appeals court 
ignored is the fact that the legislature did later repeal 
49-10-28 but that repealer was not effective until the 1st 
day of July, 1987, exactly one year after Plaintiff's 
benefits vested. The error made by the Retirement Board, 
its' attorney and its1 administrator was assuming that 
there was an implicit,repeal. 
4. The Appeals Court decision, as did the 
preceeding decisions, ignores the essentially different 
nature of 49-9a-8 vis-a-vis 49-10-28. The older 
Disability Retirement is a self standing portion of the 
overall pension plan for public employees. As such it 
vested, if and when the employee qualfied. It was 
manditory, the cost thereof was assessed and collected by 
the Retirement office, and that office still holds millions 
of dollars, collected from public employees to provide 
disability benefits, if and when the employee needs them. 
The newer act is not manditory, is not part of the 
contributory pension plan, but is merely an optional salary 
protection insurance, similar to that described in the 
parent Act, in 49-10-28.5 UCA (repealed in 1986). 
The Appeals Court rejected the "implicit repeal" 
position but still denied benefits on the contention that 
the Plaintiff did not meet the definition of "Disability" 
as defined in 49-9a-3 (10) (1983). This was plain error on 
the part of the Appeals Court, which ignored the fact that 
49-10-28 was still applicable law on the date of 
retirement, and the conditions set in that pension plan are 
the only ones applicable. 
Continued existence of 49-10-28 included the 
providing of benefits to anyone who met the conditions 
imposed by that section up until repealer of the act in 
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1987. The following sections of the 1967 act buttress that 
position; See: 
A. 49-10-2 which provides a public retirement 
system for those employees and dependants who in case of 
old age disability or death or who have _ become 
incapacjtated, may without hardship or prejudice be retired 
from active service by their employers. This part of the 
Retirement System, is not even remotely similar to the 
Disability Retirement insurance program in 49-9a-8 UCA. 
B. 49-10-2.5 which was passed contemporaneously 
with the new Retirement Act in 1983, provides that the 
parent act, 49-10 shall govern any conflict, discrepancy or 
inconsistency which might occur between the parent act and 
any other statute relating to retirement, supplemental or 
deferred income programs. 
C. 49-10-7 U.C.A. provides that it is to be the 
policy of the legislature that this act be liberally 
construed so that the benefits and protections as herein 
provided shall be extended as broadly as reasonably 
poss ible . 
D. Under 49-10-11 membership was mandatory, as 
were the contributions required under the Retirement Act. 
The new Act, by contrast, is simply an optional insurance 
program, which replaced 49-10-28.5 U.C.A. (1967), but did 
not in any way effect 49-10-28 U.C.A. (1967), which 
remained active and on the books until a year after 
Plaintiff's retirement. 
It is important to observe, that under 49-10-28 
U.C.A., millions of dollars of public employee's money was 
paid into the Disability Retirement Fund, the exact amount 
of which is known only to the Retirement Board staff. 
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Plaintiff estimates that at least $16,000,000.00 of 
contributions, plus interest accruing thereto, since 1967, 
is in the hands of the Board, and with the repeal of 
49-10-28 is a windfall to the Board, which no longer has to 
pay out anything for disability retirement. 
Under the new plan, they simply buy an insurance 
policy with newly contributed funds, and the insurance 
carrier pays any claims which may meet the new criteria. 
E. 49-10-28 sets forth it's own requirements for 
eligibility which require: 1) that the member complete 
ten (10) or more years of service (plaintiff had 20 
years); 2) that he submit to examination by the board to 
determine his physical condition (Plaintiff remains ready 
willing and able to comply with this requirement); and 3) 
that that examination show that the member is physically or 
mentally incapable of the performance of the "usual, _d_u_t_i_e_s 
of his employment", (Plaintiff's medical history (which 
includes 3 operations for ulcers, 14 hospitalizations and 
recently diagnosed diabetes) meets this requirement 
according to his doctors). 
F. 49-10-28.5 U.C.A. (1967) describes a paid 
salary protection program which was an insurance, almost 
identical to the provisions of the so-called new Disability 
Retirement Act found in 49-9a U.C.A. effective July 1, 
1983. 49-10-28.5 likewise prohibited the employee from 
collecting both under Section 28 and Section 28.5. 
G. Interestingly, 49-9a which went through the 
legislature as SB 305 went into effect July 1, 1983 (See 
laws of Utah 1983, Vol. 1, page 870), but in the 1986 
legislature the language of 49-9a-2 was changed to give 
Chapter 9a a new effective date of March 17, 1986, (except 
for State employees for whom it became effective July 1, 
1987). The compiler also notes that in 1986 the 
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legislature restricted the scope of 49-9a by limiting its 
application to Chapter 9a instead of having It apply to the 
whole act, an obvious legislative intent that the two acts, 
still then on the statute books, be treated as independent, 
equally existing retirement plans. 
By the time our present code (1987-1988) came into 
being, Chapter 49-9a had disappeared entirely and the 
present Utah Public Employee's Disability Act now found in 
49-9 U.C.A. (1987) which contains a third and again 
distinctly different definition of "total disability." 
See 49-9-103(7) (1987) : 
"Total Disability" means the complete inability 
due to injury or illness to engage in the employees 
regular occupation during the elimination period 
and the first twenty-four(24) months of disability 
benefits. Thereafter, 'total disability' means 
the complete inability to engage in any gainful 
occupation which is reasonable, considering the 
employees education, training and experience." 
It appears to the Plaintiff, that the vacillations 
of the Retirement Board, as reflected in it's recommended 
changes, effectuated by the Legislature in 1987, are a 
direct,result of this case, which pointed out the defective 
reasoning on which the 1983 definition of ftD isAb j_i ity" was 
based. 
POINT II. WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF HAS A CONSTITUTIONALLY 
VESTED CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO AN EARNED 
DISABILITY PENSION? 
The Appeals Court, in a well reasoned manner, held tha4-
the State of Utah, under the manditory membership and 
contribution plan set forth in the 1967 Public Employees 
Retirement Act, 49-10 U.C.A. is committed to the "Contractual 
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View", ie. , that the Constitution (Article I, Section 7: "No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law.") prohibits the Retirement Board from 
cutting off vested rights. See Appeals Court Opinion, P. 6: 
"...when a retired employee had made the requisite 
contributions and had satisfied all conditions 
precedent to his benefits, then the employee had a 
"vested right" in his retirement benefits as 
provided by the statute at the time of his 
retirement and a subsequent amendment could not 
reduce the amount of benefits to which the 
employee was entitled." (See cases cited.) 
From that point on, the Appeals Court Opinion is 
totally inconsistent. It ignores the fact, established under 
the cited cases, that the conditions precedent are those set by 
the statute under which _t_he .contributions _ were, _cp_l.l_ecte.d_f i.e., 
49-10-28 U.C.A. (1967), and it commits error when it concluded 
that because Plaintiff did not fit the 49-9a-3 (10) (1983) 
definition, that his rights did not vest. 
1. In the first place, the Appeals Court erred, once 
again, in passing over the crucial word "covered." 
2. Secondly, the Appeals Court erred, in failing to 
note that 49-10-28 U.C.A. (1967) was still the law until July 1, 
1987, when it was repealed. 
3. Third, it ignored the fact that Plaintiff jiad met 
all requirements for vesting of his pension benefits under the 
parent act, a year before that act was,repealed. 
4. Fourth, that the arbitrary decision of Provo City 
to not subscribe to the new disability insurance program, can in 
no way justify depriving Plaintiff of his vested pension 
benefits. After all, the old act was a fully con tr i_b_u_te_d_r- f uJJLy 
vested pension plan; its benefits are constitutionally 
guaranteed to Plaintiff, so long as he meets the conditions 
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precedent (which he does in every detail). The fact that he 
does not fit the definition in the new_ jln^ _uj_an,ce^  j>j:j^ Lram, which 
is not a pension plan, nor capable of vesting (because it is 
non-contributory), is totally immaterial and irrelevant. (See 
Appeals Court Opinion , p. 5, and cases quoted therein.) 
SUMMARY 
1. The Appeals Court decision, holding that there was 
no "implicit repeal" of the 1967 Public Employee Retirement Act, 
should have resulted in a reversal of the District Court 
decision, not an affirmation, since the only grounds for either 
the Retirement Board decision, or its' affirmation by Judge 
Noel, was the theory of "implied repeal." The Appeals Court was 
correct on that portion of its' Opinion. Only the later 
inconsistent conclusions were erroneous. 
2. Plaintiff is not a "covered" employee under the 
1983 disability insurance; his employer had not opted to be 
covered, and his particular medical condition did not qualify 
him for coverage, because he was not completely unable to engage 
in any renumerative work. Plaintiff was however, still covered 
by the pension plan described in 49-10-28 UCA (1967), he met all 
the prerequisites for benefits, and since that plan was still 
open until repealed on July 1, 1987, his right to benefits 
vested on his effective retirement date of July 1, 1986. 
3. The constitutional prohibition against depriving a 
citizen of vested rights, makes it Impossible for the 
legislature to change those benefits in any manner, after the 
fact, if it would result in his benefits being eliminated, after 
they had vested. There are undoubtedly other persons in a 
similar position too. 
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1988. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, THIS 16th Day of November 
MAILING [TIFICATE 
On this 16th day of November, 1988, the undersigned 
mailed 10 copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to the Clerk 
of the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, and two copies to Mark A. Madsen, Attorney for the 
Respondent, Utah State Betirement Board, 540 East 200 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, postage prepaid in the U.S. Mail. 
APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
' *"! """- " n- i ± — 
J. ELLIS 
AftO'n«v 
&w 
CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. BOX 1849 
PROVO. UTAH 84603 
(801) 375-1822, Ext. 330 
A p r i l 2 8 , 1986 
TO: Mayor Joseph A. J e n k i n s 
FROM: Glen J . E l l i s 
RE: R e s i g n a t i o n 
Dear Mayor, 
Pursuant to our discussions of last week, I have given 
some thought to stepping down as City Attorney. I have served 
the City since January 1, 1965. The first year I was Assistant 
City Attorney, a position under Civil Service, the last 20+ as 
a department head. Although I could opt to simply step down to 
the assistant status to fill the few remaining years I would 
need to put in to qualify for retirement, I have given, some 
thought to put in for a medical retirement instead. 
The last seven or eight months have been the most 
frustrating of my life. I have experienced a great deal of 
stress, resulting in a return of my chronic acidosis, a 
condition which has been with me for many years, and which 
resulted in my having ulcers. I was operated on three times as 
a direct result of this condition, and I feel that remaining in 
the position I am in will be further detrimental to my health. 
I have been in distress with diarrhea and stomach distress for 
most of this year, and am obliged to go in for a periodic 
dilation of my esophagus about every nine months. All of this 
is directly connected to my stressful employment. I feel that 
my long history of ulcer-related problems will probably be with 
me for the rest of my life, and if I take my retirement at this 
time, I can still be covered by City insurance. 
Accordingly, will you please accept my resignation as 
City Attorney, effective as soon as my replacement can be 
selected and trained to take over my case load and other 
responsibilities. Please ask personnel to process my request 
for medical retirement effective at the same date as I finish 
my city service. 
Very truly yours, 
fiPP PR 1QS& 
, ^
O R
 . OFFICE OF THE MAYOR 
Joseph A. Jenkins 
April 29, 1986 
Mr. Glen Ellis 
City Attorney 
Post Office Box 1849 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Dear Glen: 
It is with the utmost respect and concern for you that I accept 
your resignation as the City Attorney for Provo City. I want to 
express my appreciation for the long years of service you have 
given to our City and for the way you handled matters over that 
period of time. 
Although we have discussed on several occasions your health 
problems and the fact that some of them were related to your 
employment, I was not fully aware of the extent of your problems 
or to the degree your stressful employment contributed to 
them. We have instructed Mr. Mausser in Personnel to take the 
necessary steps to help you in any way he can in securing a 
medical retirement. 
We will be advertising for an attorney for your replacement and 
anticipate that advertising and the selection process will take 
approximately six weeks. We will then look to you for guidance 
in the training and acclimation of the person we select. We will 
leave the final date of your retirement open pursuant to getting 
another attorney on board and trained to take your place. 
If there are any other concerns that you have or help that I can 
give you please don't hesitate to call. 
Sincerely, 
Joseph A. Jenkins 
Mayor 
cc Personnel 
JAJ/nks 
UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
540 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
(801)355-3884 
BERT D. HUNSAKER 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
June 13 , 1986 
Mr. Glen J. Ellis, City Attorney 
City of Provo 
P. O. Box 1849 
Provof Utah 84603 
Dear Mr. Ellis: 
The 1983 Legislature effectively repealed the disability provisions 
from section 49-10, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, which pertains to the Utah 
State Retirement System. At that time they enacted 49a of the Code, 
which was an optional program for local governments and other political 
subdivisions. In doing this, the legislature also reduced the 
contribution rate to the employers. 
Provo City did not join the disability plan and elected to provide 
its own program. Therefore, disability coverage in the State Retirement 
System, as far as Provo City is concerned, terminated July 1, 1983. 
I respectfully refer you to section 49-9a, with particular 
attention to 49-9a-4 and 49-9a-8. After you have had a chance to review 
these sections, if you have additional questions, please write or call 
me orr if you prefer, Mark Madsen, General Counsel for the Retirement 
Board, may be reached at the same address and telephone number. 
BDH:whm 
UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
540 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
(801)355-3884 
BERT D. HUNSAKER 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
February 16, 1987 
Mr. Glen J . E l l i s 
P. 0 . Box 1097 
Provo, Utah 84603 
REGISTERED MAIL 
Dear Mr. E l l i s : 
This letter is written confirmation of the action taken by the Utah 
State Retirement Board regarding your appeal of the administrative 
denial of your disability retirement application. 
The Board voted to deny your request, based on advice of legal 
counsel and the interpretation of section 49-9a-a, enacted in 1983 by 
the Utah Legislature, which it feels specifically negates the disability 
provisions of section 49-10, U.C.A., as amended. 
As was explained to you at the hearing, Provo City elected not to 
participate in the disability program provided in 49-9a, and chose to 
provide its own program. Disability coverage of Provo City under 
any programs by the State terminated when Provo chose to exclude the 
benefits of 49-9a from its employees and provide another disability 
program. It would appear from these facts that the real issue here is 
one with Provo City and not the Utah State Retirement Board. 
If I may provide any further information I shall be happy to do so. 
BDHrwhm 
Yours s i n c e r e l y , 
/ , 
Bert D."~Bunsaker 
Executive Director 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Glen J, Ellis, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Utah State Retirement Board, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Davidson. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 870252-CA 
F I L E D 
I CAA*4L 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
C/rk of the Court 
.£* Coe'n of Appeals 
Plaintiff Ellis appeals from the district court's 
decision affirming an administrative denial of his application 
for disability retirement benefits. Ellis' main contention is 
that the lower court erred in upholding the administrative 
ruling that the 1983 Utah Disability Act rather than the 1967 
Utah State Retirement Act governed his claim for disability 
benefits. We affirm the district court's judgment. 
Ellis was the head of the Provo City Attorney's Office 
for over 20 years. According to Ellis' attending physician, 
Ellis suffered numerous medical conditions stemming from the 
stressful nature of his employment. Consequently, on April 28, 
1986, Ellis applied for disability retirement benefits. He was 
not totally disabled but, rather, sought less stressful legal 
employment. 
The Utah State Retirement Board denied Ellis' application 
for disability retirement benefits finding the Legislature 
replaced the disability plan under which Ellis sought benefits, 
see Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-10-1 to -61 (1981), with an optional 
plan in 1983, £££ Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-9a-l to -15 (1984), in 
which Provo elected not to participate and under which, in any 
event, Ellis would not have qualified because he was not 
totally disabled. 
Ellis objected to the administrative denial of benefits 
and sought a formal hearing before the Board. In a hearing 
held in February 1987, the Board listened to Ellis and then 
requested Ellis to leave the room so the Board could consider 
his application. The Board denied Ellis1 application for 
benefits. In response, Ellis filed a complaint in district 
court seeking a review of the Board*s decision. He claimed 
that if the Board was correct: in finding the Legislature 
repealed the retirement plan under which he sought benefits, 
then this repeal was unconstitutional. Ellis also challenged 
the procedure of the Retirement Board claiming the Board failed 
to comply with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act and the 
Open and Public Meetings Act. 
The Board moved to dismiss Ellis' complaint asserting it 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
Ellis moved for summary judgment arguing that, as a matter of 
law, the 1983 enactment of the long-term disability act did not 
repeal the retirement plan under which he sought benefits. The 
court granted the Boardfs motion to dismiss and denied Ellis1 
motion for summary judgment. This appeal ensued. 
I. 
At the outset, we must determine whether the Legislature 
replaced the 1967 retirement program under which Ellis sought 
and qualified for disability benefits. Since this issue raises 
a question of special law, see Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983), we must 
determine whether the Boardfs decision falls within the limits 
of reasonableness or rationality. Id. 
Our analysis of whether the Legislature replaced the 
earlier retirement program is best understood against the 
background of the relevant statutory history. Between July 1, 
1967, and June 30, 1983, state retirement benefits were 
governed by the Utah State Retirement Act. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 49-10-1 to -61 (1981). Section 49-10-28 of the Retirement 
Act provided that a state employee was entitled to disability 
benefits provided the employee had worked at least 10 years for 
the state and a medical examination determined that the 
employee was Hphysically or mentally incapable of performance 
of the usual duties of his employment and should be retired and 
the administrator so recommends to the board." 
On March 10, 1983, the Legislature enacted the Utah 
Public Employees* Disability Act. 1983 Utah Laws ch. 223, § 1 
(codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-9a-l to -15 (1984)). The 
Legislature did not expressly repeal the Utah State Retirement 
Act when it enacted the Disability Act; however, the 
Legislature clearly provided that the Disability Act would 
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cover all disabilities with a date of disability on or after 
the effective date of the Act, namely July 1, 1983. 1983 Utah 
Laws ch. 223/ § 2; Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-8 (1984). Provisions 
of the Disability Act relevant to the instant case, with our 
emphasis added, provide: 
section 49-9a-4: All employers 
participating in the Utah state retirement 
system may cover their employees under this 
act. Nothing in this act shall require any 
political subdivision or educational 
institution to be covered by this act. 
section 49-9a-8: All covered disabilities 
with a date of disability on or after the 
effective date of this act shall be 
administered under this act. Disabilities 
commencing before the effective date of this 
act shall be administered under the 
provisions of Chapter 10. Title 49. In no 
event, may a disability be covered under 
both Chapter 10, Title 49 and this act. 
Thus, in 1983 the Legislature, by clear, express language 
provided that two disability retirement systems would co-exist 
in Utah. The earlier 1967 Retirement Act would continue to 
cover disabilities commencing before the effective date of the 
1983 Disability Act. However, all those whose disabilities 
commenced after the 1983 Disability Act became effective would 
be governed by the later Disability Act. 
In order to receive disability benefits under the 
Disability Act, the employee must be totally disabled. 
"Totally disabled- is defined by the Disability Act to mean 
-complete inability to engage in any gainful occupation which 
is reasonable, considering the employee's education, training 
and experience.- Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-3(10) (1984).1 The 
effective date of the Disability Act was July 1, 1983. 1983 
Utah Laws ch. 223, § 2. After July 1, 1983, the Retirement 
Board refused to accept contributions for the Chapter 10, Title 
49 fund. 
1. Ellis concedes he is not -totally disabled- as defined by 
the Disability Act and, therefore, does not qualify for 
disability benefits under this statutory scheme. 
870028-CA 3 
On appeal# Ellis contends the Legislature did not 
impliedly repeal the Utah State Retirement Act when it 
subsequently enacted the Disability Act. We agree that the 
Legislature did not impliedly repeal the Retirement Act but, 
rather, by clear language, it expressly replaced the Retirement 
Act with the Disability Act for disability retirements 
commencing after the Disability Act's effective date. 
We acknowledge the authority governing implied repeals of 
legislation. As a general proposition, implied repeals are not 
favored and are found only if there is a manifest inconsistency 
or conflict between the earlier and later statutes. State v. 
Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1980). Subsequently enacted 
statutes relating to the same subject matter as previous 
statutes are, if possible, to be construed so as to make the 
later enactments harmonious with the former provisions. Stahl 
v. Utah Transit Authority. 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980). 
Nonetheless, 
[W]here a consistent body of laws cannot be 
maintained without the abrogation of a 
previous law, a repeal by implication of 
previous legislation . . . is readily found 
in the terms of the later enactment. It is 
the necessary effect of the later enactment 
construed in the light of the existing law 
that ultimately determines an implied 
repeal. . . . [W]here a conflict is readily 
seen by an application of the later 
enactment in accord with [the legislative] 
intent, it is clear that the later enactment 
is intended to supersede the existing law. 
1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.09, at 332 
(4th ed. 1985). This is so because when there is an 
irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the prior 
statutes relating to the same subject matter, the new provision 
is deemed controlling as it is the later expression of the 
Legislature. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 
1983). 
The foregoing authority, however, is inapplicable as we 
are persuaded the Legislature clearly and expressly provided 
that the Utah State Retirement Act would continue to govern 
disabilities arising before July 1, 1983, the effective date of 
the Disability Act, but all those disability retirements 
occurring thereafter would be governed by the Disability Act. 
Therefore, there is no irreconcilable conflict between the 
Retirement Act and the Disability Act as the two acts are 
4 
mutually exclusive. A disability is governed by one statutory 
act or the other, but not both. A consistent body of law is 
maintained and the Disability Act does not abrogate the 
Retirement Act. 
The date of Ellis1 disability is April 26, 1986/ i.e., 
after July 1, 1983, which is the effective date of the 
Disability Act. Consequently, the Disability Act governs 
Ellis1 disability retirement benefits. However, as previously 
mentioned, supra Note 1, Ellis is not ••totally disabled- as 
required by the Disability Act. Therefore, Ellis is not 
entitled to disability benefits under the governing statutory 
scheme. 
II. 
Notwithstanding our holding that Ellis does not qualify 
for benefits under either retirement scheme, we must now 
determine whether the Legislature's replacement of the 
Retirement Act with the Disability Act unconstitutionally 
deprived Ellis of vested contractual rights. Ellis contends 
that if the Disability Act governs his eligibility for 
disability retirement benefits, then he was unconstitutionally 
denied his vested contractual rights to an earned disability 
pension. Under Utah law, Ellis' argument is without merit. 
There are two lines of authority addressing the rights of 
retired employees. One line of authority holds that a 
retirement plan is a gratuity in which the recipient has no 
vested rights and, consequently, is freely terminable at the 
employer's option. See, e.g., Keegan v. Board of Trustees, 412 
111. 430, 107 N.E.2d 702 (1952) (retirement plans which mandate 
compulsory participation confer no vested rights upon 
recipients because statutes affording such benefits rest upon 
the sovereign power of the state and are not in the nature of 
contracts between the participant and the state); Roach v. 
State Bd. of Retirement, 331 Mass. 41, 116 N.E.2d 850 (1954) 
(holding that an employee had no vested rights to pension which 
were infringed by the repeal of the pension statute despite 
employee's eligibility for retirement prior to repeal); Dallas 
v. Trammell, 129 Tex. 150, 101 S.W.2d 1009 (1937) (public 
employee has no vested rights in a statutory pension). 
The other line of authority adheres to the contractual 
view which reasons that once a public employee has fulfilled 
all the conditions precedent to receiving retirement benefits, 
the employee has certain vested rights which cannot be impaired 
by subsequent administrative or legislative enactments. See, 
e.g., Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402 P.2d 541 (1965) 
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(right to public pension vests upon acceptance of public 
employment and laws of state are part of every contract); Betts 
v. Board of Admin, of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys., 21 
Cal.3d 859, 148 Cal. Rptr. 158, 582 P.2d 614 (1978) (public 
employee's pension constitutes an element of compensation, and 
a vested contractual right to pension accrues upon acceptance 
of employment); In re State Employees' Pension Plan, 364 A.2d 
1228 (Del. 1976) (vested contractual rights exist under state 
pension law for those public employees who have fulfilled 
eligibility requirements); Miles v. Tennessee Consolidated 
Retirement Sys., 548 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1977) (public employee 
has contractual right to pension benefits). Under the 
contractual view, state legislatures may reasonably alter the 
terms or modify the retirement system to improve it or keep it 
on a sound basis prior to retirement for purposes of 
maintaining the integrity of the system. See, e.g., Betts, 582 
P.2d at 617. Once the retirement benefits have vested, 
however, the Legislature can modify the plan only upon a 
showing that a vital state interest will be protected, Miles, 
548 S.W.2d at 305, and only where a substantial substitute is 
provided for in lieu of the loss of benefits sustained. 
Newcombe v. Qgden Citv Public School Teacher's Retirement 
Comm'n, 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941, 948 (1952). 
Utah adheres to the contractual line of authority. In 
Driogs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Bd., 105 Utah 417, 142 
P.2d 657 (1943), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that an 
employee who receives a mere* gratuitous allowance awarded for 
appreciation of past services has no vested rights in the 
allowance and it is terminable at will. Lei. at 659. On the 
other hand, when a retired employee had made the requisite 
contributions and had satisfied all conditions precedent to his 
benefits, then the employee had a -vested right" in his 
retirement benefits as provided by the statute at the time of 
his retirement and a subsequent amendment could not reduce the 
amount of benefits to which the employee was entitled. Ifi. at 
663-64. 
Since Driggs, our supreme court has consistently held 
that the employee has this vested pontractual right only when 
he has satisfied all conditions precedent to receiving the 
benefit, i.e., he has attained retirement age, or has been 
medically disabled. See Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement 
Sys, Bd. of Admin., 122 Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 597 (1952); 
Newcombe v. Qgden Citv Public School Teachers' Retirement 
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Comm'n, 121 Utah 503# 243 P.2d 941, 947 (1952).2 
Based upon the foregoing authority, we are persuaded 
Ellis wasnot depriye.d_of vested contractual benefit S-Jbecanse 
he failed to IsalTIsfy the conditions precedent to hls^jdisability 
retiremenTr"benef iT§7 namely ~EllTs had not become "disabled and 
retired before the Legislature enacted the Disability Act. 
Consequently, he was not entitled to benefits under the 
governing Disability Act. 
III. 
Ellis further contends the Retirement Board violated the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act3 by failing to comply with rule 
making procedures when it determined the Retirement Act had 
been replaced by the Disability Act in deciding Ellis1 
eligibility for disability benefits. Ellis contends that such 
a determination was, in effect, a policy determination subject 
to adequate advance notice to all affected parties, an 
2. We note, however, that Driggs was slightly modified in 
Newcombe. In Newcombe, the court held a statute which dissolved 
a statutory pension system invalid as to retired employees. 
Newcombe. 243 P.2d at 948. In dictum, however, the court 
acknowledged that had the Legislature -attempted to make changes 
in local retirement systems for the purpose of strengthening 
them, there would be no difficulty in finding authority to 
support such action." I&. at 946. To support this dictum, the 
court relied on several cases holding that vested rights of 
retired employees are not impaired by a reduction in the amount 
of the pension payments pursuant to statutes enacted subsequent 
to retirement, provided the purpose of such statutes is to 
render the retirement pension system actuarially sound. 
3. The Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-46a-l to -15 (1986), was significantly revised and amended 
in 1987, after the commencement of this action. Accordingly, 
our analysis focuses on the administrative provisions in effect 
at the time of Ellis' hearing before the Retirement Board. 
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opportunity to participate, and an opportunity to comment,4 
Any agency subject to the Administrative Rulemaking Act 
promulgating a rule must follow the procedures specified. See 
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1986) 
(interpreting the Utah Rule Making Act, the predecessor to the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act). The Administrative Rulemaking 
Act requires rule making whenever -agency actions affect a 
class of persons" and defines a rule as "a statement made by an 
agency that applies to a general class of persons, rather than 
specific persons . . . [which] implements or interprets policy 
made by statute . . . ." Utah Code Ann, §§ 63-46a-(3)(a), 
-2(8) (1986).5 
The critical question, therefore, is whether the 
Retirement Board's decision to deny Ellis disability retirement 
benefits based upon its interpretation of the language of the 
Disability Act amounted to a rule within the meaning of the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, -We acknowledge that there is a 
variance of opinion on when an agency is engaged in rule making 
and must follow formal rule making procedures, and when an 
agency may legitimately proceed by way of adjudication." 
Williams, 720 P.2d at 776, See generally 2 K, Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 7.2 (2d ed. 1979). -Many rules 
are the product of rulemaking, and rulemaking is the part of 
the administrative process that resembles a legislature's 
enactment of a statute. An order is the product of 
adjudication, and adjudication is the part of the 
4. The Retirement Board contends that Ellis did not raise the 
applicability of the Administrative Rulemaking Act below and, 
therefore, is precluded from raising this issue for the first time 
on appeal. We disagree. The record indicates that Ellis raised 
this issue not only in his amended complaint but also in his 
motion for summary judgment. 
5. The Retirement Board argues that it is exempt from the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act because it is a -political 
subdivision." Since the commencement of this action, the Utah 
State Retirement Act was amended and the Legislature decreed that 
the Board "shall voluntarily comply" with the provisions of the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-201(4) 
(1987). This new language implies that during the period of time 
at issue here the Board may indeed have been exempt from the Act's 
coverage. But see Utah Attorney General Informal Opinion 86-16 
(June 4, 1986), wherein Utah's Attorney General concludes that the 
Retirement Board was required to comply with the requirements of 
the Administrative Rulemaking Act. Inasmuch as we conclude that 
the Board, in any event, complied with the Act, we need not decide 
whether it was required to do so. 
8 
administrative process that resembles a court's decision of a 
case." 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.2# at 4 (2d 
ed. 1979). 
In Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the definition of 
-rule- contained in the Utah Rule Making Act, the predecessor to 
the Administrative Rulemaking Act.6 In Williams, the 
petitioners charged the Public Service Commission with failure 
to follow proper administrative procedures in concluding that it 
did not have jurisdiction to regulate one-way mobile telephone 
paging services. The supreme court held that the Commission's 
letter stating that no certificate of public convenience and 
necessity was required constituted a "rule" and, consequently, 
the Commission, when reaching this determination, should have 
followed the rule making procedures. Id. at 776. The court 
relied on three factors in reaching this conclusion. First, the 
Commission's decision was generally applicable. Second, the 
letter interpreted the scope of the Commission's statutory 
regulatory powers, thus interpreting the law within the meaning 
of the Act. Finally, in so acting, the Commission made a 
"change in clear law" by reversing its long-settled position 
regarding the scope of its jurisdiction and announcing a 
fundamental policy change. Id. 
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude the Retirement Board 
was not engaged in rule making and, therefore, did not have to 
adhere to rule making procedural requirements. Rather, the 
Board was merely applying the explicit statutory language of the 
Disability Act to the facts of Ellis' case. The explicit 
language of the Disability Act provides that that Act, not the 
Retirement Act, governs all disabilities with a date of 
disability after July 1, 1983. Ellis' date of disability is 
April 26, 1986. This administrative process does not resemble 
the Legislature's enactment of a statute. On the contrary, the 
administrative process examined here resembles a court's 
decision applying explicit statutory language. The only policy 
decision which was generally applicable was made by the 
Legislature in its enactment of the Disability Act. The change 
in clear law in this instance was promulgated by the 
Legislature, not the Retirement Board. Therefore, the 
Retirement Board was not compelled to follow the rule making 
procedures of the Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
6. The court stated that its conclusion would not be any 
different had the court been called upon to interpret the 
definition of "rule" within the meaning of the subsequently 
enacted Administrative Rulemaking Act. Williams, 720 P.2d at 
775 n.7. 
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IV. 
The final issue we address is whether the Retirement Board 
violated the Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1981), when it requested Ellis to leave the 
room while it deliberated his appeal from the administrative 
denial of benefits. 
The Open and Public Meetings Act requires that every 
"meeting- of a -public body- be open to the public. As used in 
this Act, -public body- means -any administrative, advisory, 
executive or legislative body of the state or its political 
subdivisions which consists of two or more persons that expends, 
disburses or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue and 
which is vested with the authority to make decisions regarding 
the publicfs business." Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2(2) (1981). 
We are persuaded that the Open and Public Meetings Act is 
not applicable to the Retirement Board. First, the Utah State 
Retirement Fund is administered as a common trust fund and not 
supported by tax revenue. Second, the Retirement Board is not 
vested with authority to make decisions regarding the public's 
business. The Board administers funds for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries and not for the public at large. Hansen v. Utah 
State Retirement Bd., 652 P„2d 1332, 1338 (Utah 1982). When 
Hansen was decided, -[s]ome 80 percent of the beneficiaries 
[were] not state employees, but employees of municipalities or 
counties.- Id. MNo state funds [were] appropriated to meet any 
administrative costs.- Xfi. Ellis' argument that the Board 
acted contrary to the Open and Public Meetings Act is without 
merit. 
>&dc6&, 
Affirmed. 
& 
Judith M. B i l l i n g s , Judge 
WE COJJCUR: 
Greenwood, Judge 
{^': -S. ^u^JU^vs^ 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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event shall the amount of the death benefit 
provided by this section be less than S600 and the 
iccumulated contributions of the deceased member, 
except for: 
(1) A person who entered covered employment 
at age 65 or later. This deceased member1! benefit 
shall be a refund of his accumulated contributions 
or $600, whichever is larger. 
(2) A deceased member who has no dependent 
beneficiary. This deceased member*s death benefit 
shall be a refund of his accumulated contributions 
or $600, whichever is larger. 
(c) The foregoing part of the death benefit as 
provided in (b), based upon the member's past 
compensation, shall, not be paid to the beneficiary 
of an inactive member unless the member has credit 
for ten or more years of service or unless the death 
of the member occurs either: (I) Within a period of 
120 calendar days after the last day of service for 
which said person received compensation; (2) while 
said person is still physically or mentally incapacit-
ated from performance of his duties, provided that 
such incapacity has been continuous since the last 
day of service for which he received compensation, 
or (3) said person is on military leave and has 
elected to remain in active contributing membership 
status as provided in section 49-10-19; providing 
that in no case shall such part of the death benefit 
as cited in this paragraph be paid to any person 
except a dependent beneficiary. 
(d) The death benefit for an inactive member, 
except as otherwise provided in (c) above, shall be a 
return of the deceased member's accumulated cont-
ributions only. 
(e) A member, or his beneficiary after death of 
'.he member, may elect, by a written document filed 
with the retirement office, to have the death benefit 
paid in monthly installments, fixed in number or 
amount, but not involving life contingencies, subject 
to such rules as the board may adopt. Regular 
interest shall be credited on the unpaid balance of 
njch benefit. 
Payment of the foregoing death benefits by the 
retirement office shall be deemed to be a full acqu-
ittance of a beneficiary's claim against the system, 
tod the said system shall not be liable for any 
further or additional claims or assessments on 
behalf of the deceased member. 
Unless specified otherwise in a written document 
Hied in the retirement office on or after July I, 
1971, death benefits payable to dependent benefici-
aries shall be made in the following order of prece-
dence: 
(1) Surviving spouse, 
(2) Surviving children under 21 years of age, 
*nd mentally or physically handicapped children 
tgardless of age, share and share alike, 
(3) All other dependent beneficiaries. 
If the deceased member has no dependent benefi-
ciary and section 49-10-42 is not applicable, the last 
Written beneficiary designation on file with the reti-
c e n t office shall be used in determining the bene-
Sciary or beneficiaries to whom death benefit 
fcyinents should be made. In the event there are no 
^pendent beneficiaries and no beneficiary designa-
tion on file with the retirement office, the death 
2*yments shall be distributed in accordance with the 
^ovisions of section 49-10-43. 
In the implementation of this section and for 
Administrative purposes only, the Utah tax commis-
si* is authorized and directed to provide pertinent 
formation to the retirement administrator, unon 
Pensions 49-10-23.5 
his request, concerning dependents claimed by a 
deceased member on his income tax return covering 
the year previous to his death. \m 
49-10-29. Disability benefits - Retirements for 
eligibility - Pay meat foe medical services and advice 
rendered to board. 
A member sh*fl be entitled to receive disability 
benefits upon approval of the retirement board after 
medical examination if the following requirements 
have been met: 
(a) Said member has completed and has standing 
to his credit ten or more years of service on the 
date of disability retirement. 
(b) Said member, within two years after last 
rendering covered service, and whose covered empl-
oyment was terminated due to a physical or mental 
condition existing at the time of termination, has 
been examined by one or more physicians or 
surgeons selected by the board pursuant to the 
request of his employer, said member or person 
acting on his behalf or of the board. 
(c) Said medical examination and such other 
evidence as may be available shows to the satisfact-
ion of the administrator that said member is physi-
cally or mentally incapable of the performance of 
the usual duties of his employment and should be 
retired and the administrator so recommends to the 
board. 
The board shall obtain ar.d pay from the interest 
earnings of the fund for ruch medical services and 
advice as may be necessary to carry out the provisi-
ons of this section. mi 
49-10-23.5. Disabled member - Continuation of 
eligibility for retirement benefits - "Benefit protect-
ion contract.* 
Any department or political subdivision, covered 
by any system administered by the retirement office 
which has established a paid salary protection 
program under which its officers or* employees, 
during periods of disability arising out of sickness 
or accident, shill be paid by it or by an insurance 
underwriter of the disabled member's rate of comp-
ensation in effect at the time disability occurred, 
may with the approval of the retirement board enter 
into a 'benefit protection contract* with the retire-
ment office. 
The benefit protection contract shall among other 
things provide a means whereby: 
(1) The disabled person shall be deemed to be an 
active participating member of his respective retire-
ment system and as such shall continue to accrue 
full-time service and salary credits during the time 
member and employer contributions, based upon his 
full rate of pay in effect at the time disability 
began, are paid to the retirement office. 
(2) The disabled person or his beneficiary shall 
remain eligible during the contract period for any 
retirement system benefits provided by the retirem-
ent system act under which he is a member. 
The retirement board shall establish the manner 
and times when member and employer contributions 
are to be paid. A failure to make the required 
payments shall be cause for the board to cancel the 
contracts as to all individuals or any individual 
covered by the contract- Service and salary credits 
granted and accrued up to the time of cancellation, 
however, shall not be forfeited. 
During the term of the contract the disabled 
person shall not be entitled to receive disability reti-
rement benefits under the provisions of the retirem-
for benefits and all matters relating to the ad-
istration of the fund. If the executive officer of 
board is unable to determine factors such as 
fth of service, compensation, or the age of any 
)loyee covered by this act, the executive officer 
f estimate these factors for purposes of any 
essary determination". An employee may 
Ucnge any decision of the board and appeal that 
ision to a proper district court of the State of 
in. 
2) Nothing in this act shall require the obscrva-
of formal rules of pleading or evidence in any 
uing before the board. ift3 
9a-7. Employer contribution rate. 
during each legislative session, the retirement 
ird shall certify to the legislature the percentage 
employer contributions required to fund the 
blic employees* disability fund. Upon the board's 
:ommendation, the legislature shall adjust retire-
;nt contribution rates to maintain adequate 
riding for the disability fund. inj 
-9a-4. Disabilities covered by this chapter or ret-
meat act. 
All covered disabilities with a date of disability 
i or after the effective date of this act shall be 
[ministered under this act. Disabilities commencing 
ifore the effective date of this act shall be admini-
ered under the provisions of Chapter 10, Title 49. 
t no event, may a disability be covered under both 
hapter 10, Title 49 and this act. in* 
h-H-9. Periods for which benefits are payable. 
(1) Upon receipt of proof that an employee has 
ecome totally disabled as a result of (a) accidental 
odily injury which is the sole cause of disability 
ad is sustained while this act is in force (hcrcinaf-
!r referred to as the injury) or (b) disease or illness 
ausing total disability commencing while this act is 
a force (hereinafter referred to as the illness), the 
und will pay to the employee a monthly disability 
>enefit for each month the total disability continues 
>eyond the elimination period, not to exceed the 
naxirrtum benefit period. 
(2) Successive periods of disability which: (a) 
result from the same or related causes, (b) are 
separated by less than six months of continuous full-
time work at the individual's usual place of emplo-
yment, and (c) commence while the individual is an 
employee covered by this act, shall be considered as 
t single period of disability. The inability to work 
for a period less than 15 consecutive days shall not 
be considered as a period of disability. Otherwise, 
successive periods of disability shall be considered 
u separate periods of disability. 
(3) The retirement board shall have authority at 
*ay time to have any employee claiming disability 
t^amined by a physician chosen by the board to 
ktermine if the employee is disabled and the extent 
tf the disability. 19SJ 
**-9a-10. Amount of benefit payments • Physicia* 
•t care required - Reductions in benefit payments. 
(1) The monthly income disability benefit shall be 
*o-thirds of the regular monthly salary paid as of 
e^ last day of the actual service. Payments shall 
** be made under the fund established in this act 
'<* any period of disability unless the employee is 
t&dcr the regular care and treatment of a physician. 
(2) The monthly disability income benefit 
*herwise provided under the fund shall be reduced 
*T any amount received by or due the employee 
time during which the employee it ert::!ed to receive 
the monthly disability benefit: 
(a) Social security, including all benefits 
received by the employee, the emplo>ec*i spouse. 
and the employee's dependent ch.!d:en. In the event 
social security benefits are increased to compensate 
for a change in the consumer price index, the 
monthly disability income benef.t shall not be 
further reduced, but shall only b< offset by benefits 
determined at the level in effect at the time benefits 
commence. 
(b) Workmen's compensation. 
(c) Armed services, retirement or disability 
programs. 
(d) Civil service retirement or disability 
programs. 
(e) Disability benefits under any group 
insurance plan providing disability income benefits 
for which contributions or payroll deductions are 
made by the employer. 
(0 Any retirement or disability program for 
which the employee is eligible, including, but not 
limited to, programs provided by the United States 
government, state government, or by any departm-
ent or subdivision thereof. 
(3) Any amounts received by or payable to the 
employee from one or more of the sources listed in 
subsection (2) shall be considered as amounts 
received by the employee whether or not the 
amounts were actually received by the employee. 
(4) In order to be eligible for benefits under this 
act the employee shall first apply for ail disability 
benefits from governmental entities listed in subsec-
tion (2) to which the employee is entitled. The 
employee shall also first apply at the earliest eligible 
age for all retirement benefits to which the 
employee is or may be entitled. If the employee fails 
to apply, the board may make application on the 
employee's behalf. The board may treat as income 
any amount the employee is entitled to receive but 
docs not receive because application for benefits is 
not made by the employee. The board may reduce 
the monthly disability accordingly. m3 
49-9a-ll. Psychopaihologk disability. 
The fund established under this act does not 
provide monthly disability benefits for disability 
that is primarily due to psychopathology. In the 
place of monthly disability benefits for psychopath-
ology, the following benefits are provided: 
(1) Up to two years of disability benefits based on 
the usual disability provisions. 
(2) During the period of disability noc to exceeu 
two years, payment by the board of up to $10,000 
for psychiatric expenses, including rehabilitation 
expenses approved by the board's consultants. 
(3) If the employee is institutionalized, payment 
by the board of disability benefits according to co-
ntractual provisions for a period not to exceed five 
years. \m 
49-9a-12% Disabilities not covered. 
The fund does not cover any loss resulting from 
the following: 
(1) Self-inflicted injury. 
(2) War or any act of war, or suffering while in 
military or naval services of any country at war. 
(3) Alcoholism. 
. (4) Drug addiction. IMJ 
49-9a-13. Termination of disability payments -
Calculation of disabled employee's retirement 
;?DEKX> 
For ANNOTATIONS, coosolt the latest UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS. 631 
UTXH CODE Pensions 49-9-302. 
The Insurance Department shall biennially audit 
all funds and programs authorized under this 
chapter and report its findings to the governor and 
the Legislature. \w 
Chapter 9. Utah Public Employees* 
Disability Act. 
Part 1. General Provisions 
Part 2. The System and Fond 
Part 3. Contributions 
Part 4. Benefits 
Part 1. Genera! Provisions 
49-9-101. Short title. 
49-9-102. Purpose. 
49-9-103. Definition!. 
49-9-101. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the 'Utah Public Emp-
loyees'Disability Act." im 
49-9-102. Purpose. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide long-
term disability benefits for employees of employers 
participating in any system administered by the 
board except employees covered under the Firefig-
hters' Retirement Act, or employees covered under 
the Public Safety Retirement Act who are covered 
under a long-term disability program offered by a 
political subdivision which is substantially equivalent 
to the program offered by the state under this 
chapter. The program shall be administered by the 
executive officer of the board through the retirement 
office, under the policies and rules promulgated by 
the board. im 
49-9-103. Definitions. 
(1) 'Educational institution" means a political 
subdivision or an instrumentality of a political sub-
division, an instrumentality of the state, or any 
combination of these entities, which is primarily 
engaged in educational activities or the administra-
tion or servicing of educational activities. The term 
ncludes, but is not limited to , the State Board of 
Education and any instrumentality o f the State 
Board of Education, institutions o f higher education 
irid their branches, school districts, and vocational 
md technical schools. 
(2) "Employee* means any employee of an empl-
oyer who participates in any system administered by 
to board, except those employees exempt from 
Average under Section 49-9-102. 
(3) 'Elimination period" means the five months at 
*^ e beginning of each continuous period of total 
Usability for which no benefit will be paid and 
eminences with the date of disability. 
(4) ' M a x i m u m benefit period" means the 
^^aximum period of time the monthly disability 
^ m e benefit will be paid for any continuous 
Period of total disability. 
(5) 'Physician* means a legally qualified physi-
r
*n. 
(6) 'Rehabilitative employment* means any board-
^Proved occupation or employment for wage or 
;°fit, for which the employee is reasonably quail-
ed by education, training, or experience, in which 
^ employee engages while unable to perform his 
^pation as a result of injury or illness. 
&) "Total disability' means the complete inabi-
**• due to injury or illness, to engage in the empl-
i^ ' s regular occupation during the elimination 
period and the first 24 months of disability benefits. 
Thereafter, 'total disab.iit)" means the complete 
inability to engage in any gainful occupation which 
is reasonable, con^deriTg the employee's education, 
training, and experier.ee. 'Total disability* exists 
only if during any period of "total disability" the 
employee is under the regu'ar care of a physician 
other than the emplo>ee. 
(8) "Date of disability" rr.rms the date on which a 
period of continuous disability commences, and may 
not commence on or before the last day of actual 
work. w 
Part 2. The System and Fund 
49-9-201. Creation of program. 
49-9-202. Creation of trust fnnd. 
49-9-203. Eligibility for membership is the program. 
49-9-201. Creation of program. 
There is created for emp!o>ees of employees par-
ticipating in any system administered by the board, 
unless otherwise exempted under this chapter, the 
"Public Employees* Long Term Disability 
Program." itti 
49-9-202. Creation of trust fund. 
There is created the "Public Employees' Disability 
Trust Fund' for the purpose of paying the benefits 
and costs of administering this program. The fund 
shall consist of all money paid into it in accordance 
with this chapter, whether in the form of cash, sec-
urities, or other assets, and of all money received 
from any other source. Custody, management, and 
investment of the fund shall be governed by Chapter 
1, Title 49. 19»7 
49-9-203. Eligibility for membership in the 
program. 
All employers participating in any system admin-
istered by the board may cover their employees 
under this chapter, except employees covered under 
the Firefighters' Retirement Act. Nothing in this 
chapter requires any political subdivision or educa-
tional institution to be covered b> this chapter. \m 
Part 3 . Contributions 
49-9-301. Contributions to fond program . Adjustment 
of retirement contribution rate. 
49-9-302. Rates established on basis of agency experience 
• Limitations • Annual report to governor and 
Legislature. 
49-9-301. Contributions to fund program 
Adjustment of retirement contribution rate. 
During each legislative session, the board shall 
certify to the Legislature the percentage of employer 
contributions required to fund the Public Emplo-
yees* Disability Trust Fund. Upon the board's rec-
ommendation, the Legislature shall adjust retirement 
contribution rates to maintain adequate funding for 
the disability trust fund. \m 
49-9-302. Rates established on basis of agencv 
experience - Limitations • Annual report to 
governor and Legislature. 
The board shall establish the contribution rate 
based on the experience of the various public agen-
cies and political subdivisions participating in the 
program, which rate may not exceed I^B of salaries 
and wages and shall report annually to the governor 
and the Legislature the current contribution rates 
assessed to the public agencies and political subdiv-
isions. 19S7 
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